Recht und Rechtsverwirklichung – Probleme der Gesetzgebung und der Rechtsphilosophie

Eugen Huber

Eugen Huber, Recht und Rechtsverwirklichung – Probleme der Gesetzgebung und der Rechtsphilosophie, Basel, Helbling & Lichthenhan, 1920

Introduction

With this work we find swiss legal philosophy already at its best, from the beginning at the very pinnacle of its future development. Eugen Huber, praised as the genius that elaborated the Swiss Civil Code based on his investigations on the private law of the Swiss Cantons, is often neglected as a legal philosophical thinker. He himself did not understand his contributions as philosophical or pretend himself to be a philosopher; rather his legal thought is considered to be that of a jurisprudent reflecting his subjects profoundly and in relation to the whole life of spirit. “Ein Philosoph, der, von seinem System der Weltanschauung getragen, über unseren Gegenstand gesprochen hätte, würde unzweifelhaft ein ganz anderes Buch geschrieben haben. Allein es mag dem Juristen vorbehalten sein, nicht nur für seine Fachgenossen, sondern auch für den philosophischen Fachmann mit seiner Art der Darstellung manches in neue Beleuchtung gebracht zu haben, ohne deshalb unwillkommen zu sein”. Apparently, Huber was fully conscious of the new dimensions he introduced in legal philosophy, but with the modesty only self-confidence can prove as appropriate. The principal monography in question dates of the old age of its author, and is dedicated to his friend Rudolf Stammler, teaching at the University of Marburg at that time.

The book in question by Eugen Huber covers some 450 pages that are filled with condensed argumentations. In the first part there is a direct correspondence with the later essay on “Absolutes Recht” (1922), as well as some overlapping with the two earlier treatises “Über die Realien der Gesetzgebung” (1913) and “Bewährte Lehre” (1910) by the same author. They can all be considered to contain independent preparatory work (see nos. 1.2 and 1.4 of this Legal Anthology). According to the sub-title, “Probleme der Gesetzgebung und Rechtsphilosophie”, we find abbreviated and condensed a general setting of idealistic legal theory, however with attention to the specific task and function of jurisprudence in conjunction with the codified law. The proper innovation included in this concept consists in a comprehensive occupation with the juridical-philosophical dimension of the accomplishment, fulfilment and realisation of the legal order. Thereby the differences, deviations and enhancements are of special interest, which is always the case when the realisation, the of law is taken into consideration.

As a motto for the lecture of the eminent writing in question, let us allude to dedication of Eugen Huber on the titlepage of the biography by Fritz Wartenweiler that reads: “Feuriges Gefühl für das Seinsollende zeichnet die wachsenden Zeiten & Menschen aus”. The very same sentiment may characterise the portrayed grand man of Swiss jurisprudence and author of the work to be discussed, himself. It is not so easy, however, to grasp the particular novelty of the approach inaugurated by Huber. According to Adolf Menzel, this difficulty is due to an intermediate, mediating standpoint of the author: “Es ist nicht leicht, Hubers Grundgedanken herauszuarbeiten, da er zwischen einer soziologisch-psychologischen Auffassung und einer idealistischen, von Rudolf Stammler beeinflussten Rechtstheorie zu vermitteln suchte” (“Zum Problem Recht und Macht, in: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Staatslehre (Sitzungberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse, vol. 210, no. 1), Wien/ Leipzig: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1929).

Historical Situation and Systematic Context

In order to start in medias res, let us refer to the dedication of the monography to Rudolf Stammler, among whose friends we can also find its author Eugen Huber. Neo-Kantian legal philosophy as summarised and accentuated by Stammler serves as a point of reverence as well as of criticism at the same time, as it has been pointed out by Felix Somló: “Vielleicht ist es Stammler gerade durch die seltsame Verknüpfung von Eigenschaften, der befruchtenden Fragestellung mit der unbefriedigenden Lösung derselben, in so hohem Mass vergönnt, anregend zu wirken und zum bedeutendsten Kristallisationspunkt der neueren Rechtsphilosophie zu werden. Er vermag es, wie kein anderer, rechtsphilosophische Untersuchungen hervorzulocken und an den seinigen sich emporranken zu lassen. Sein abgerundetes, scharfsinniges und tiefernstes, aber schliesslich doch nicht befriedigendes Gedankensystem ladet förmlich zu einer Untersuchung darüber ein, an welchem Punkt man ihm die Gefolgschft zu versagen hat. Dadurch wurde er so Vielen zum willkommenen Vehikel ihrer Gedanken; dadurch wirde er auch zum Meistbesprochenen und Meistumstrittenen der neueren deutschen Rechtsphilosophie, wie ja der Schüler häufig gerade dem widerspricht, von dem er am meisten gelernt, im Kampf mit dem er sich zu einer eigenen Ansicht durchgerungen hat” (Juristische Grundlehre, Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 2nd ed. 1927; 1st ed. 1917, pp. 45 s.).

In function to the importance of this general setting of Neo-Kantianism for the legal philosophical thought of Huber, let us briefly represented the well-known exponents of this orientation of legal philosophy: Often forgotten is Emil Lask who took part in the south-west-German current of Neo-Kantianism, together with Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert (“Rechtsphilosophie”, in: Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Eugen Herrigel, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1923, vol. 1, pp. 275 ss.). This scholar of philosophy had projected an extensive legal philosophy but died prematurely in the First World War. Better known are the exponents of the so-called Marburg neo-Kantianism, represented by Paul Natorp who also held “Vorlesungen über praktische Philosophie” in 1925), as well as of the less known Wilhelm Schuppe with his “Grundzüge der Ethik und Rechtsphilosophie” from 1881. For further reading in the subject of the legal philosophy of the so-called Marburger Neo-Kantianism, please consult Claudius Müller (“Die Rechtsphilosophie des Marburger Neukantianismus – Naturrecht und Rechtspositivismus in der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Hermann Cohen, Rudolf Stammler und Paul Natorp”, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1994). It may be historically wrong, even if it turns out to be right in the outcome and in review, to compare the verdict of Neo-Kantianism by Erich Kaufmann, who judged Kantianism in the domain of practical philosophy to be too abstract, purified from concrete experience, yet senseless, and to be a purely rational theory, that metaphysically misunderstood pure cognition. (“Eine Kritik der neukantischen Rechtsphilosophie – Eine Betrachtung über die Beziehungen zwischen Philosophie und Rechtswissenschaft”, Tübingen: J. C. B: Mohr, 1921). Concurring influence can be distinguished by the Writings of Wilhelm Wundt, especially his treatise on “Ethics” (Ethik – Eine Untersuchung der Tatsachen und Gesetze des sittlichen Lebens, 3 vols., Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1886, 4th ed. 1912) and his “Völkerpsychologie” (Völkerpsychologie – Eine Untersuchung der Entwicklungsgesetze von Sprache, Mythus und Sitte, Leipzig: Alfred Kröner, 1918, vol. 9: Das Recht).

Despite this, at the time of Eugen Huber, there was a high tide of Neo-Kantianism in the philosophy of law, for instance in Italy in conjunction with Neo-Thomism in the figure of Giorgio Del Vecchio (“Grundlagen und Grundfragen des Rechts – Rechtsphilosophische Abhandlungen”, 1963). This predominance has only been balanced with some concurring opinions one can find in Gustav Radbruch. In general, despite the Kantian references, many of the Neo-Kantians have in fact still adherent to Natural Law theories. In this situation, an increment of this tendency is welcome, and it occurs with Huber, who is at the same time deeply influenced by the so-called “Historische Rechtsschule”, by the historical, historistic theory of law, as represented among others by his academic teachers, i.e. by Otto von Gierke (“Die historische Rechtsschule und die Germanisten”, 1903) and by Johann Adolf Tomaschek in Berlin, as well as by Lorenz von Stein in Vienna (Rudolf von Ihering seems to be a special case to me). Within the Historical School of law, we can often not find a decisive distinction between nature and history, although there is an inclination toward the cultural aspects of historical development. It may not be a hazard that the theoretical and philosophical foundation of historicism has been achieved by a Neo-Kantian thinker, namely by Heinrich Rickert (“Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung – Eine logische Einleitung in die historischen Wissenschaften”, 1913).

Contrarily, Neo-Hegelianism was only in germination in German-speaking Europe at that time, non-regarding the political exploit by right and left wing Hegelianists, maybe with the exception of Hans Freyer (“Theorie des objektiven Geistes – Eine Einleitung in die Kulturphilosophie”, Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1923; Idem: “Der Staat”, Leipzig: Fritz Rechfelden, 1925) and of Theodor Litt (“Individuum und Gemeinschaft – Grundfragen der sozialen Theorie und Ethik”, Leipzig/ Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1919; Idem: “Erkenntnis und Leben – Untersuchungen über Gliederung, Methoden und Beruf der Wissenschaften”, Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1923), and with significant and interesting exceptions of Walther Schönfeld (“Über den Begriff einer dialektischen Juridprudenz”, in: Greifswalder Universitätsreden, vol. 20, Greifswald: L. Bamberg, 1929) and Hermann Heller (“Staatslehre”, ed. Gerhart Niemeyer, Leiden 1934) where the concrete realisation is understood as manifestation of the claim of individual consciousness for universal validity. A fundamentally different situation can only be found in Italy with a true reception of Hegelianism by Bertrando Spaventa and the first consequently reformed Hegelian philosophy of law by Giovanni Gentile (“I fondamenti della filosofia del diritto”, 1916).

The position held by Eugen Huber decidedly finds itself in contrast and in fundamental dissent with positivism in legal philosophy, as represented specifically by Hans Kelsen (“Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre entwickelt aus der Lehre vom Rechtssatze”, 1911, 2nd ed. 1923; and Idem: “Reine Rechtslehre – Einleitung in die rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik”, 1934) and as symptomatically accentuated by Rudolf Bierling (“Juristische Prinzipienlehre”, 5 vols. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1894; Idem: “Zur Verständigung über Begriff und Aufgaben der Juristischen Prinzipienlehre”, in: Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, vol. 11 (1917/ 1918), pp. 205 ss., Berlin/ Leipzig: Walther Rothschild, 1918). The overall situation and constellation in the domain of legal philosophy in the time of Fin-de-Siècle and in the first two decades of the twentieth century can be characterised in the following ways, in consequence: we find lasting Natural Law theories and predominating positivism in controversy and contradiction with each other, and there becomes more and more manifest a common obligation to build a bridge between both, or rather an invitation to invent new strategies to overcome both of these well documented, but insufficient and unsatisfying positions.

Content, Abstracts/Conclusions, Insights, Evidence

As our proposal to read, we have selected extracts from the second part of “Recht und Rechtsverwirklichung”, dealing with the realisation of law, with the claim to be valid law, with the application of law, as well as with the methodology of legal thought, as in the first part we encounter subjects also treated in the very same way in the essay “Das Absolute im Recht” (see no. 1.2 of this Legal Anthology).

Following the concept of law established by Eugen Huber, the law (“Sollen”) is to be realised to become true (“Sein”) in the way of application. The legal order stands for the objectivation, or positive realisation of the idea of law. By legislation, the law as a mere ideal becomes practical, gains reality. This is simply done by obeying certain rules constantly, so that they consist in normal behaviour, together with the conviction, that the individuals follow a legal norm (opinio iuris). The identification of the rule of law occurs by means of increasing consciousness of institutes of law, institutions of law and the legal order itself. This process has much to do with common sentiment within a legal community, and the binding power of customary law becomes the principal legislator. “Das Wesen der Gemeinschaft in Gestalt dieser Gebundenheit ist allezeit und überall notwendig gegeben”. By this tendency, factual power is converted to legal power, to the empowerment to develop and applicate the legal order, and in consequence legislating and judicial organs are assigned to establish the objective legal order with its rights and duties. Legal community is based upon a set of elements that ensure cohesion, for instance language, religion and class. “Vergegenwärtigen wir uns demgegenüber die Gemeinschaft der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, so bestätigen wir eine alte Entdeckung, wenn wir feststellen, dass kein einziger der unterschiedenen Kohäsionsfaktoren die Schweiz zusammenhält. Und doch besteht dieser Zusammenhang in einer uns immer neu erfassenden Kraft. Daraus können wir die Einsicht gewinnen, dass die angeführten Momente eben doch nur Kohäsionsfaktoren, und nicht Voraussetzungen der Gemeinschaftsbildung sind. Sie begünstigen die Bildung der Gemeinschaft, aber weder der eine noch der andere ist begrifflich oder praktisch absolut notwendig”. The legal community of the modern nation state turns out to be more and more directed toward aims and efforts. The following arguments resemble a reduction of the extended version of “Der Zweck im Recht” by Rudolf von Ihering, whose lectures Huber assisted in Vienna. We also encounter a notion that will be of lasting importance for Swiss legal thought, i.e. “Organisation der Gemeinschaft”, a concept that affects more the inner order than the outer organisation of a legal community. This concept will be at the core of the second principal monography in the history of Swiss legal philosophy, written by Walther Burckhardt only five years later (see no. 1.6 of this Legal Anthology).

As for the concept of so-called realities of legislation, wherein truly consists a personal invention of the author, we refer to the extended discussion in a separate essay by Eugen Huber (see no. 1.3 of this Legal Anthology).

The main force behind the realisation of the legal order is free will, as legal norms are normally obeyed without any formal enforcement of the duties of the legal order. This seems to be obvious, however it is often neglected by legal reasoning. If we seriously pose the question why people obey the law, the answer will not be the power of authority standing behind the legal norms, but simply other directives, inclinations, even when the subjects do not know about their legal obligations. Maybe they consult their relatives in cases of uncertainty, or they seek legal advice. This insight helps to overcome the paradox of how legal order can be completed in the way of the application of the law. In consequence, legal decision making can be adopted as a true source of law as it is disposed by the 1st article of the Swiss Civil Code, where “bewährte Lehre und Überlieferung” are simply translated into French and Italian languages as “jurisprudence”, respectively “giurisprudenza” (this crucial point has been developed separately by Huber in an essay, see no. 1.4 of this Legal Anthology). At this point we find a reference to the categorical imperative as it is formulated by Immanuel Kant in his “Critique of practical reason”: “Finde der Richter aber auch hierin [in der bewährten Lehre und Überlieferung] keine Anhaltspunkte, so kann er nur noch seiner Überzeugung folgen, und was hiefür ihm als Anweisung gegeben zu werden mag, besteht einzig darin, dass gesagt wird, er habe den Fall nicht nach Willkür, nach dem augenblicklichen Eindruck der Umstände, nach Mitleid, Entrüstung oder persönlicher Neigung zu entscheiden, sondern so, als würde er gleich dem Gesetzgeber den Satz formulieren, um ihn dan auf den Fall anzuwenden, der seines Urteils harrt”. We have to be careful and precise in our understanding: first the judge has to establish a norm of decision and second to applicate this legal norm to the case in question by interpretation and application. There is no structure of judicial judgment in general by any method, knowing that methodology alone cannot guarantee the outcome to be true and just. Huber payed special attention to the justification of sanction in the domain of penal law.

With respect to logics and methodology, Eugen Huber inserts the legal consciousness in the process of legal reasoning, as mentioned just before. A specific modality of juridical judgment is postulated (“juristische Denkungsart”) that distinguishes legal thought: “Dieses juristische Denken beruht selbstverständlich auf logischen Grundsätzen, aber es handelt sich für dasselbe nicht um reine Logik, sondern um eine Logik, bei der eine besondere Art des Urteils mitzuwirken hat. Juristisch Denken heisst nicht einfach ein Rechnen mit Begriffen, sondern eine Operation, die durch das Rechtsbewusstsein beherrscht wird”. This consciousness is not to be confused with a mere feeling or sentiment, as it has been claimed by the trend of so-called “Gefühlsjurisprudenz”. Legal consciousness means conscious knowledge, cognition that includes the subject of cognition, that acknowledges the creative activity of the subject that has to recognise the law: “Das juristische Denken erfolgt nach allgemeinen Regeln, die in dem Wesen des Rechtes begründet sind. Sie wohnen dem Rechte inne und sind notwendig, wie das Recht selbst. Sie lassen sich nicht willkürlich setzen, sondern treten nur deshalb verschieden auf, weil ihre Erkenntnis mehr oder weniger klar sein mag, wie das bei jedem Erkennen der Fall ist. [...] Jedermann, der im Rechte tätig ist, hat sich zu bemühen, die Regeln, nach denen dieses Denken erfolgt, so zu erfassen, dass sie ihm stets vor Augen stehen und er sich nach ihnen als selbstverständlich zu richten vermag. Sie müssen ihm, wie man zu sagen pflegt, in Fleisch und Blut übergehen. Andernfalls kann auch der Gebildetste in eine gefühlsmässige oder schablonenhafte Rechtsbetätigung verfallen”. Therefore, jurisprudence has to be a part of the human sciences: “Bei den Geisteswissenschaften begegnen wir der Wertung und Beurteilung der menschlichen Handlungen nach einer Idee, unter deren lebendigem Bilde die geschichtlichen Tatsachen erfasst und zustimmend oder ablehnen dargestellt werden. / Diese Idee nun ist bei der Rechtswissenschaft die Rechtsidee, aus der wir unsere Rechtsüberzeugung gewinnen”. The concept of law consists in the overall outcome of the totality of all practical applications of the self-conscious legal judgment.

Philosophical Valuation and Jurisprudential Significance

Neo-Kantianism applies the foundation of natural sciences to human sciences, not taking into consideration the Kantian monition of prerogative of practical reason above pure reason. This has been partially corrected by the foundation of the human sciences as provided by Wilhelm Dilthey. Law in practice pretends to be a “Sollen” that is destinated to be realised, to become “Sein”, according to the synthesis of Hegelian dialectics “Sein – Nicht-Sein – Werden, or Sein-Sollen”. “Ideal-Realism”, as it is inaugurated by Eugen Huber, can serve as a strategy to overcome these deficiencies of Neo-Kantianism, so that Hegelianism can be actualised by means of reconsidering Kantianism (see Nicolai Hartmann: Diesseits von Idealismus und Realismus, in: Kant-Studien, Philosophische Zeitschrift, vol. 29, 1-2 (1924), Berlin: Rolf Heise, 1924, pp. 160 ss.).

Law can also be understood as claim for validity of a certain rule to be implemented in society or better community, as it is described in the form of teleological rationality (of a kind of economy in the larger sense) by Rudolf von Ihering, i.e. as a characteristic sign of morality (“Der Zweck im Recht”, Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, 1877/ 1883, vol. 2), or even as it is admitted by Rudolf Stammler as counterstatement to the Marxist understanding of social philosophy (“Wirtschaft und Recht nach der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung – Eine sozialphilosophische Untersuchung“, Leipzig: Veit & Co., 1896, 3rd ed. 1914, 5th ed. 1924).

Reception essays on “Recht und Rechtsverwirklichung” have been written and published by Hans Kelsen, in: Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Strafrecht, vol. 34, pp. 217-246, and by Arthur Baumgarten, in: Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, vol. 15 (1921/ 1922), S. 341 ss., among others. This shows the great influence on legal thought that this writing must have had. Eugen Huber was once claimed to be true positivist and once criticised to be a positivist and relativist! This shows the controversial reception of its conception. Max Rümelin protects Huber from both of the objections (“Eugen Huber”, Rede gehalten bei der akademischen Preisverteilung am 6. November 1923, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1923, pp. 76 ss.), holding that Huber follows his idealistic state of mind in a critical sense, i.e. according to the foundations of Kantianism or Neo-Kantianism, and gives a true fellow of Rudolf Stammler in this respect – with a decisive difference, however, insofar as he did not build monumental constructions, but followed closely the reality of legal consciousness and experience, equal to prefer the pragmatic practice of law above any abstract theory of law, and that means to found a veritable legal theory of legal practice.

Further Information About the Author

Eugen Huber, born 13 July 1849 in Oberstammheim, died 23 April 1923 in Berne, followed (among others) the lectures of Rudolf von Ihering at the University of Vienna during his studies. Rudolf Stammler and Max von Rümelin were counted among his friends.

In 1881 he was named professor of federal law, civil law and legal history at the University of Basel. He was asked by the “Schweizerischer Juristenverein” to develop an overview over the legal order of the 25 Swiss cantons in order to establish grounds for the unification of Swiss civil law, a duty he was prepared to fulfil in excellence, which is proved by the four volumes of “System und Geschichte des schweizerischen Privatrechts” (1886-1893). As a historian, he collected a variety and peculiarites of the specific Swiss common law, that characterised the legal order of the Swiss federal state. As the very basis of the unification and codification of Swiss civil law, he identified the collective Swiss public spirit (the so-called “Volksgeist”), an idea that resembles more the public consciousness or common sense for the law.

Between 1882 and 1892, he taught commercial law and German public law at the University of Halle an der Saale.

It was only in 1892 that he was called back to Switzerland to take the ordinary chair for civil law, legal history and philosophy of law at the University of Berne. From the Swiss Federal Government, he soon got the task to prepare the codification of Swiss civil law and developed a proposal for the later “Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch” (1900). By an intelligent combination of existing traditions and modern innovations he succeeded in a reconstruction of the hidden common understanding of Swiss private Law. His proposal found approbation in 1907 and gained validity in 1912.

In retrospective, he completed his philosophically informed views of law only in his later period of life. In his groundbreaking and masterful work on “Recht und Rechtsverwirk­lichung”, he identified jurisprudence as a contributor to the cognition and perception of the law, according to the Kantian criticism in epistemology. Courts and judges are an integrative part of the finding of the law, and their interpretations of the common law serve as a veritable source of law.

In 1922 his last work on legal philosophy appeared, devoted to the “Absolute im Recht”, where he claimed that the ideal of the law is based on the common sentiment or the common sense of the law. However, this was not meant to be an unaltered idealistic legal theory, but rather intended to establish a ground of positive law and its tendency to realise the eternal idea of law. Therefore, the ideal has to be proved by the reality of sociocultural legal practice.

For further information, please consult:

Theo Guhl: Eugen Huber, in: Schweizer Juristen der letzten hundert Jahre, mit einem Vorwort von Max Huber, mit einer historischen Einleitung von Eduard His, ed. Hans Schulthess, Schulthess & Co. A.-G., Zürich 1945, pp. 323ff.;

Dominique Manaï: Eugen Huber – Jurisconsulte charismatique, Basel/ Frankfurt am Main: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1990;

Max Rümelin: Eugen Huber, Rede gehalten bei der akademischen Preisverteilung am 6. November 1923, Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1923;

Aloïs Troller: Eugen Hubers Allgemeingültige Rechtsphilosophie, in: Gedächtnisschrift für Peter Jäggi, ed. Bernhard Schneider and Peter Gauch, Universitätsverlag Freiburg Schweiz 1977;

Fritz Wartenweiler: Eugen Huber – Der Lehrer, Gesetzgeber, Mensch, Zürich/ Leipzig: Rotapfel-Verlag 1923.

Selected Works of the Same Author

Eugen Huber: Erläuterungen zum Vorentwurf eines Schweizerischen Civilgesetz­buchs, Bern: Büchler & Co., 1902 (pp. 1-39); Idem: Das Absolute im Recht – Schema­tischer Aufbau einer Rechtsphiloso­phie, in: Festgabe der juris­tischen Fakul­tät der Berner Hochschule zur Jahresversammlung des Schwei­ze­rischen Juristen­vereins von 1922, Bern: Stämpfli & Cie. AG, 1922; Idem: Über die Realien der Gesetz­gebung, in: Zeitschrift für Rechtsphilo­sophie in Lehre und Praxis, ed. Felix Holldack, Rudolf Joergens and Rudolf Stammler, Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1913, pp. 39ss.; Idem: Bewährte Lehre – Eine Betrach­tung über die Wissen­schaft als Rechtsquelle, Bern: K. J. Wyss, 1910.

For Further Reading

Julius Binder: Über kritische und metaphysische Rechtsphilosophie, in: Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Gesetzgebungsfragen, ed. Josef Kohler und Fritz Berolzheimer, vol. 19 (1915/ 1916), pp. 18ss. and 142ss., Berlin/ Leipzig: Walther Rothschild, 1916;

Giorgio Del Vecchio: Die Gerechtigkeit, Basel: Verlag für Recht und Gesellschaft, 1940; Idem: Individuum, Staat und Korporationen, Vortrag gehalten am 30. April an der Universität Zürich, in: Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht, ed. Eduard His, N. S. vol. 54 (1935), Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1935; Idem: Grundlagen und Grundfragen des Rechts – Rechtsphilosophische Abhandlungen, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1963;

Gustav Radbruch: Rechtsidee und Rechtsstoff – Eine Skizze, in: Kant-Festschrift zu Kants 200. Geburtstag am 22. April 1924, im Auftrag der Internationalen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie ed. Friedrich von Wieser u.a., S. 183ff., Berlin-Grunewald: Walther Rothschild, 2. Ed. 1924; Idem.: Die Problematik der Rechtsidee (1924), in: Gesamtausgabe, vol. 2, ed. Arthur Kaufmann, Heidelberg: C. F. Müller, 1993; Idem: Einführung in die Rechtswissenschaft (1. Ed. 1910; 8. Ed. 1929), in: Gesamtausgabe, vol. 1, ed. Arthur Kaufmann, Heidelberg: C. F. Müller, 1987; Idem: Der Relativismus in der Rechtsphilosophie (1934), in: Gesamtausgabe, vol. 3, ed. Winfried Hassemer, Heidelberg: C. F. Müller, 1990; Idem: Die Natur der Sache als juristische Denkform (1948), in: Gesamtausgabe, vol. 3, ed. Winfried Hassemer, Heidelberg: C. F. Müller, 1990;

Rudolf Stammler: Die Lehre vom richtigen Rechte, Berlin: J. Guttentag, 1902; Idem: Theorie der Rechtswissenschaft, Halle an der Saale: Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1911; Idem: Lehrbuch der Rechtsphilosophie, Berlin/ Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter, 3. Ed. 1928; Idem: Begriff und Bedeutung der Rechtsphilosophie (1914), in: Rechtsphilosophische Abhandlungen und Vorträge, Berlin-Charlottenburg: Rolf Heise, 1925, vol. 1, pp. 1ss.;

Alois Troller: Eugen Hubers Allgemeingültige Rechtsphilosophie, in: Gedächtnisschrift für Peter Jäggi, ed. Bernhard Schneider and Peter Gauch, Freiburg im Üechtland: Universitätsverlag, 1977.

Text

You can find a scan (PDF) of the original text here: Huber Recht und Rechtsverwirklichung.